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Introduction 
 
 Within anarchist thought and practice the question of violence is 
invariably a matter of controversy and dispute. [Pauli 2015: 142; Gelderloos 
2007, 2015; Miller 1984: 109-123]   According to many thinkers, anarchy will be 
non-coercive, and the political and social methods and practices of anarchists 
should be pacifist or, at least, non-violent.  Violence is coercive, and anarchism is 
dedicated to the realisation of social relations that are non-coercive; 
furthermore, anarchist means should prefigure their political and ethical ends. 
[Miller 1984:109]  Reception of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865) has often 
focused on his aversion to violent revolution, appropriating him into the 
category of 'utopian' thinkers, in contrast to Marxist realism.   Tolstoy's theory of 
state coercion can be traced to Proudhon [Rivett 1988: 31; Bartlett 2013: 143]  
and subsequently there have been engagements between anarchism and 
pacifism in the thought and practice of Mohandas Gandhi [1869-1948], who was 
significantly influenced by Tolstoy, and other prominent anarchist thinkers who 
developed practices of non-violence.[Pauli 2015: 142-3]   
 On the other hand, anarchism is often associated with violence, both in 
popular imagination but also in its own frame.[Miller 1984:109]  The twentieth 
century Cercle Proudhon, inspired by Georges Sorel, read Proudhon very 
differently and was associated with aggressive political programmes and 
tactics.[Darville et al 1912; Navet 1992]  Anarchist activists and thinkers have 
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argued for a distinction between the violence of the state, and violent actions by 
those who oppose state oppression and are working towards anarchist non-
coercive social relations.  Anarchist activism must include a diversity of kinds of 
action.  Among these actions that are normally classified as violent - physical 
fighting, the use of weapons, destruction of property and even injury to persons -  
will figure.  This in part is because violence can be effective in situations where 
non-violence is ineffective.   In any case the situation in oppressive exploitative 
societies enforced by state authority is already violent, so violence is necessary. 
[Gelderloos 2007, 2015]  
 In this paper we examine controversies and disputes about the place, 
meaning, and justification of violent action in anarchism focussing mainly on  
the nineteenth century thinkers Mikhail Bakunin (1814-1876), Leo Tolstoy 
(1828-1910), and Peter Kropotkin (1842-1921). Bakunin, Tolstoy and Kropotkin 
share a common aristocratic Russian heritage and education, and the early 
career pattern of state service associated with that.  They all dramatically 
dissented from their social inheritance [Woodcock 1975; Leier 2006; Miller 
1976).  Tolstoy turned to art before his spiritual crisis further turned his writing 
more towards non-fictional essays in which he worked out a justification for a 
pattern of life and action that is best characterised as christian anarchism 
[Woodcock 1962:  207-222 esp 215].  Bakunin and Kropotkin more directly 
jettisoned their aristocratic Russian duties and privileges for the lives of 
international anarchist activists, engaged in writing propaganda and theory, and 
in political organisation and campaigning [Schatz 1990: xv-xx; Woodcock 
1962:134-206; Leier 2006: 7].  Both were centrally preoccupied with the 
antagonistic relations between social democracy, developing marxist 
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communism, and anarchism.  They overlapped in time and had near meetings, 
but did not actually encounter one another personally [Kropotkin 
1899/1971:288-9]. Kropotkin included Tolstoy as an important figure in his 
Encyclopaedia Britannica 1910 article 'Anarchism' [Kropotkin 1910/ 1995: 246].  
There is a link between Kropotkin's and Tolstoy's work: Tolstoy's disciple 
Vladimir Chertkov and his translator Aylmer Maude met Kropotkin to discuss his 
campaigns on behalf of Mennonite pacifist conscentious objectors and used 
aspects of that campaign as a model for Tolstoy's campaign on behalf of the 
Dukhobars [Bartlett 2013: 378-9].  We also cite writings by others engaged in 
efforts to think about and enact revolutionary and social anarchism, such as  Paul 
Brousse (1844-1912)  and Errico Malatesta (1853-1932).   
 This focus on these nineteenth century Russian anarchists in their 
European political context is justified by their continuing status as prominent 
figures in anarchist political and intellectual history.  Relatively close 
examination of their arguments and positions allows us to trace complexities in 
the theory of violence, and to examine the interaction of philosophy, practice and 
context.  Such a focus avoids homogenising 'anarchism'.  The coherence and 
continuity of anarchist thought and practice is a matter for detailed analysis, and 
cannot be assumed.  It is striking to us, though, that questions wrestled with by 
Bakunin, Tolstoy, and Kropotkin are still live in contemporary twenty-first 
century anarchist argument.  The association or otherwise between anarchism 
and non-violence, and the effectiveness and justification of violence as tactic and 
violence as strategy, are readdressed in recent disputes. [Gelderloos 2007, 2015]  
Anarchism is, in part, a philosophy of individual autonomy, but it is also a project 
for collective liberation.  Questions of political responsibility, and in particular 
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the way  individual decisions to engage in violent or non-violent action can and 
should be justified, and the political implications of such individual decisions, 
were, as we go on to show, of first importance to the thinkers studied here.  
 Bakunin, Kropotkin, and Tolstoy each articulate, with varying degrees of 
explicitness, ambivalence about violence in relation to political power.  Instead of 
reading this ambivalence as a mark of culpable contradiction, we read it as the 
outcome of a particularly profound recognition of and engagement with the 
dynamics of violence in both repressive and resistant politics, and a recognition 
of the dynamic and tense relationship between individual and collective action. 
Anarchism, unlike other contemporaneous progressivist and resistant 
ideologies, found itself working through and colliding with the difficulties of 
drawing clear lines between violence and non-violence in political action, and 
between good and bad violence.   These thinkers demonstrated the fragility as 
well as the appeal of an idea of non-violent politics in the world as it is and as it 
might be.   
  
Anarchism, violence and the 'Propaganda of the Deed' 
 During the time in which Bakunin, Kropotkin and Tolstoy were active and 
writing, anarchism was associated with violence in several different ways. There 
were associations, pointed out by Kropotkin, between anarchist thought, 
propaganda, political effort and action, and contexts of heightened levels of 
social, political and state violence.  Anarchist political organisation and action 
resisted legal orders and police regimes that sought violently to repress incipient 
anarchism, real and imagined.[Kropotkin 1910/1995:242; Miller 1984:111]    
These same regimes were focussed as well against the so-called threats and 
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dangers of socialism.  And, of course, anarchists as much as socialists had close 
links with labour organisations and promoted the idea of the general 
strike.[Kropoktin 1910:242]  But the relevant historical periods were marked, 
also, by antagonism and splits between socialism and anarchism, in which it was 
in the interests of socialists, if not explicitly to depict anarchists as crazy and 
violent, at least not to deny the association.   In particular, when Marx and his 
allies moved to expel Bakunin from the International at the 1872 Congress, much 
was made of Bakunin's association with Sergei Nechaev and his implication in 
Nechaev's violence and criminality.[Nechaev 1869; Woodcock 1962:160-1]  It is 
notable that Nechaev's 'Revolutionary Catechism' is not included in current 
anthologies of anarchist writing, although it is listed among anarchist works on 
the marxist website www.marxists.org. 
  In addition, materially violent episodes - periods of riot, state repression 
of political movements, attempted and actual assassination as a political strategy  
- were associated particularly with anarchism via processes of cultural framing 
which can be traced to the genres and conventions of popular press coverage in 
interaction with popular fears and with state security purposes.  However, this 
was not simply a matter of reactionary forces concerned to delegitimise and 
make deviant the political construction of an anarchist vision of a just society.  
Some anarchist activists themselves - in what follows we discuss Zasulich and 
Henry -  framed violent political action as anarchist.  Relatedly, certain elements 
of anarchist theory - notably the category of 'propaganda by deed' - were 
associated, by connotation, with eruption and with disruption and with the 
possibility of exemplary violence. 
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 Bakunin's relationship with, and theory of, violence is said by critics to be 
difficult to characterise and interpret unambiguously. [Woodcock 1962: 
136,151,160-2; Miller 1976:174; Marshall 1992:pp]  His utterances about 
violence range from an early Hegelian commitment to 'a passion for destruction', 
which is a 'creative passion'[Bakunin 1842/1971:57; Leier 2006:111] to the 
project of galvanising insurrection and speaking of the value of war.  Bakunin 
found himself in an awkward relationship with the kinds of Russian groups who 
launched the 'mad summer' of 1874 which was widely attributed to his 
influence. [Shatz 1990:xxxv-vi]   Against campaigns of assassination and 
bombing, Bakunin insisted, in Leier's words, that 'the revolution sought to 
destroy institutions, not individuals'.[Leier 2006:226]  He argued that 
assassination would achieve nothing.  However, he refused to condemn 
Karakozov, the would-be assassin of Tsar Alexander II in 1866.[Leier 2006:226-
7] 
 This strategic ambiguity is made more complicated to interpret by 
Bakunin's close association during 1869-70 with Sergei Nechaev, whose 
commitment to merciless, calculated, revolutionary passion, hating everyone and 
everything with an equal hatred, was muddled up with habits of extortion and 
theft, culminating in murder. [Confino 1973:17-32; Leier 2006:228-238; 
Marshall 1992:283-285; Carr 1937:398; Woodcock 1962: 160-2].  Some 
historians treat Nechaev as an opportunist with very indeterminate ideological 
commitments or identity. [Confino 1973:26]   For many he belongs to the history 
of terrorism and associated phenomena, not to the history of anarchism as 
such.[Carr 1933/2007:255]   Either way, his excessive violence, and betrayal of 
Bakunin's and others' trust, means that his membership of the canon of 
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'anarchist thinkers' is tendentious.  The view that 'everything is permitted' is a 
reasonable inference from his argument that  
'everything is moral that contributes to the triumph of the revolution; 
everything that hinders it is immoral and criminal.' [Nechaev 1869; 
Marshall 1992: 280]. 
 Commentators remark that it is difficult to see how Nechaev managed to 
beguile Bakunin for so long.  Undoubtedly the two were intimately linked for the 
year 1869, the year of the composition of the 'catechism' and the link was strong 
enough for the attribution of the catechism to Bakunin (or to Bakunin and 
Nechaev as joint authors), which is made explicitly by Raymond Carr.[1937:394; 
Confino 1973:42; Leier 2006:233-4]  This attribution has not stood up to serious 
historical documentary and textual scrutiny.  Leier argues that it can only be 
based on the most superficial of similarities and parallels, and on misreadings of 
Bakunin who insists consistently that violence is to be directed against 
institutions, not people; he nowhere advocates assassination, nor terrorism. 
[Leier 2006:249]  In particular, Nechaev's catechism focusses on a version of  
'the immiseration thesis': 
22. The Society has no aim other than the complete liberation and 
happiness of the masses.... Convinced that their emancipation and the 
achievement of this happiness can only come about as a result of an all-
destroying popular revolt, the Society will use all its resources and energy 
towards increasing and intensifying the evils and miseries of the people 
until at last their patience is exhausted and they are driven to a general 
uprising.' 
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But, Leier argues, Bakunin rejected any immiseration theory: the most terrible 
poverty is insufficient for revolution, and indeed is as likely to produce despair 
and patience, obedience rather than rebellion. [Leier 2006: 238]  
 Bakunin's  'Letters to a Frenchman' invokes freedom, which can be a 
spontaneous characteristic of human life, given the right political and social 
system:  
The anarchistic system of revolutionary deeds and actions naturally and 
unfailingly evokes the emergence and flowering of freedom and equality, 
without any necessity whatever for institutionalised violence or 
authoritarianism. [Bakunin 1870/1971:194] 
But, in the French case, this flowering of freedom can only proceed from 
'primitive ferocious energy' of the peasants who hate all government, comply 
only under compulsion, and can and will make common cause with the city 
workers.[Bakunin 1870/1971:200] And this will involve war: 
Yes, there will be civil war.  But why be so afraid of civil war?  ... have 
great ideas, great personalities, and great nations emerged from civil war 
or from a social order imposed by some tutelary government? [Bakunin 
1870/1971:205] 
Civil war, Bakunin goes on, is always favourable to the awakening of popular 
initiative, and to the intellectual, material and moral interests of the populace:  
And for this very simple reason: civil war upsets and shakes the masses 
out of their sheepish state, a condition very dear to governments, a 
condition which turns peoples into herds to be utilised and shorn at the 
whims of the shepherds.  Civil war breaks through the brutalising 
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monotony of men's daily existence, and arrests the mechanistic routine 
which robs them of creative thought.[Bakunin 1870/1971:205]   
He goes on to argue that in the civil war that he foresees men's self-interest and 
common sense will prevent slaughter, or devastation of the countryside, and 
indeed will allow peasant organisation to develop and perfect itself, in a socialist 
direction.[Bakunin 1870/1971:206-7] 
 In Kropotkin's thinking we find a congruent argument - of the naturalness 
of cooperative freedom, but the necessary role of violence in dismantling the 
corrupting system that represses freedom.  He was committed to the 
'naturalness' of anarchism which is in accord with those instinctive recognitions 
of human worth and dignity, of mutuality and the value of cooperation, which 
would be made possible and realised when a revolution for freedom removed 
the artificial constraints on human behaviour that are imposed in unequal, 
exploitative societies with their failures of distribution,  failures to meet human 
needs and self-defeating (at best) state governments.[Shatz intro 1995:xix; 
Kropotkin 1902/1987:208-12,218-9]  He argued in an article in Le Revolte that a 
structure based on centuries of history cannot be destroyed with a few kilos of 
dynamite.[Miller 1976:174] 
 But he also argued that a mass insurrection would be necessary to 
achieve change, even if it requires 'rivers of blood'.[Shatz 1995:xiii; Cahm 
1989:92-3; Miller 1976:104]   He viewed acts of assassination and other violence 
as useless if not counterproductive, but he refused to condemn the assassination 
of Alexander II in 1881, consequently was expelled from Switzerland where he 
had fled after his escape from St Petersburg military hospital in 1876, and 
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subsequently was arrested in 1882 in France as part of a crackdown on anarchist 
organisations.[Shatz 1995:xiv, xxvii] 
 As a radical member of the Chaikovsky circle - which was engaged in the 
production and distribution of illegal literature in 1872 [Cahm 1989:92] -  
Kropotkin drafted a manifesto for the group which revealed his own Bakuninist 
commitments, which were in some contrast to other members of the group who 
were not particularly anti-state, nor committed to popular revolt.  The manifesto 
was accepted only after vigorous discussion.   It committed the group to 
participation in peasant revolt with concentration on one location, rather than 
spreading resources thinly.  From our point of view, the place of violence in this 
action, and the justification of it, is of particular interest.  As Cahm puts it:  'Above 
all, Kropotkin felt that the group could do no better than be involved in a revolt 
whose savage repression would reveal the true evil nature of the regime, and 
encourage others to follow the example of the first martyrs, thus preparing for 
the eventual revolution:  
"Let the nobility and the tsar be displayed at least once in all their bestial 
nakedness, and the rivers of blood spilled in one locality will not flow 
without consequence.   ... perhaps there is no better outcome for us than 
to drown ourselves in the first river which bursts the dam." ' [Cahm 
1989:93]  
  It is true, then, to say that both Bakunin and Kropotkin associate violence 
above all with the state.  This they share with Tolstoy.  Absent the organised 
violence of the state, anarchist freedom and cooperation would be not only 
possible but probable - in particular, Kropotkin argued that the natural laws of 
human society enjoin cooperation, production, and the emergence of stable 
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forms of association without coercion, oppression or repression.[Kinna 
1995:273-6; Miller 1976:181-198; Kropotkin 1887/1927:47-8]  
 A problem for the politics of anarchism in their time, though, is that 
modern states have succeeded in disguising their coercion and violence under 
the appearance of consent, civility, economic necessity, piety, rights, social 
conformism and the rest.  Hence the importance of the motif of revelation, 
unmasking, showing what cannot be told - the violence of the state and social 
order that the anarchists seek to overturn.  Anarchist strategy sets out to make 
plain the violence that underlies social order, by showing what happens when 
anyone seriously dissents from the state or seeks to challenge it, including the 
challenge of enforcing legal or natural rights.  Both Bakunin and Kropotkin face 
up to the fact that challenge to the state will unleash violence, and they argue 
that revolutionary actors must not be afraid of the violence that is unleashed.  
But this motif of the necessity and inevitability of violence is subtly mixed with 
the motif of the strategic provocation and revelation of violence in anarchist 
politics.   
 The category 'propaganda by deed' is traceable in its anarchist denotation 
to  Mikhail Bakunin's 'Letter to a Frenchman on the present crisis' (1870) in 
which he speaks of  'the anarchist system of revolutionary deeds and 
actions'[Bakunin 1870/1973:194; Cahm 1989:76] and then more explicitly to his 
'Letter to the comrades of the Jura federation' (1873/1971:352]  This letter 
contains Bakunin's resignation from the federation for reasons of ill health and 
because, although he considered himself capable of continuing to propagandise, 
'the time for grand theoretical discourses, written or spoken, is over. ...  This is 
the time not for ideas but for action, for deeds.' [1873/1971:352]  In 1877 Paul 
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Brousse published in the Bulletin of the Jura Federation the article 'La 
propagande par le fait' which takes up the idea of 'showing [people] what they 
cannot read'.[Brousse 1877/2005:150; Woodock 1962:278] 
 The category itself is consistent both with exemplary violence and with 
exemplary pacifism.  It has associations with the tradition of christian love or 
agape: 'Let them show their love by the works they do for each other, according 
as the Apostle says: 'let us not love in word or in tongue, but in deed and in 
truth.' '[el Bay ed 2009: 28] Robert Graham, in his introduction to Brousse's 
1877 article, argues that the association or equation with 'terrorism' is wrong - 
propaganda by deed means nothing more than leading by example, the principle 
that actions speak louder than words. [Graham ed 2005:150; Cahm 1989:76-7; 
Miller 1984:98-9] 
 It is notable, though, that Brousse's first example of a deed which will 
command attention and contain a lesson is a demonstration which is designed to 
show how civil liberties are empty:  
'Show [them] the article in the constitution allowing [them] to bring out 
the red flag, then bring out that flag: the State and the police will attack 
him; defend him; crowds will show up for the ensuing meeting; a few 
words of plain talk, and the people get the point.' [Brousse 
1877/2005:151]   
This first example is based on Brousse's experience and interpretation of the 
demonstration in Berne on March 18 1877.  His second is the abortive uprising 
in the region of Benevento, Italy, in 1874 in which anarchists took over two small 
communes, burned the archives, and demonstrated their contempt for 
government by handing tax monies back to the people. [Graham ed 2005:151; 
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Miller 1984:100]   His further elaboration of possibilities based on this second 
strategy again anticipates state violence and insurrectionary self-defence:  
'let the workers and their families move into salubrious accommodation 
and the idlers be tossed into the streets; if attacked, fight back, defend 
oneself, and if one loses, what matter? The idea will have been launched, 
not on paper ....' [Graham ed 2005: 151] 
Brousse, then, certainly does not connect propaganda of the deed with violent 
deeds.  However, he does connect it with the exemplification and the 
demonstration, the showing, of the violence of the forces of reaction and the 
forces of oppression. Subsequently, anarchist critics of Brousse associated 
propaganda of the deed with l'agence provocateur.[Cahm 1989:79]  
 We should note here that for Bakunin  the point of deeds is not 
propagandist - for him war will be socially transformative in the sense of 
destructive of institutions of oppression and cruelty.   So despite the way the idea 
of propaganda of the deed can be traced to his thought, there is some distance 
between his views and Brousse's.  Kropotkin similarly disliked the concept and 
did not use it in connection with his own ideas about strategy and the place of 
violence.[Cahm 1989:92]  However, for both of them, the strategy of revealing 
the state's violence continues to be central to their thinking about the question  
of state in relation to revolutionary violence.   
 
Anarchism, non-violence and peace.   
 As we remarked above, the legacy of Proudhon was often taken to be a 
legacy of non-violence, of anarchist refusal to engage in the coercion of state, or 
the violences of societies hitherto, and instead to develop associations based on 
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freedom. [Kelley and Smith 1994: xxxiv]  The principles that the ends must 
condition the means, that a non-coercive, voluntarist, cooperative outcome can 
only be got by non-coercive, voluntarist and cooperative strategies have also 
been a prominent part of anarchist thinking. [Marshall 1992:pp; Leier 2006:315-
6]   A good deal of anarchist theory focusses on the creative projects of collective 
living and production.[Kropotkin 1910/1995: 233-5; Kropotkin 1902/1987:208-
29; Kinna 1995:277-9]  In this context, violent actions by anarchists are seen as a 
corruption of a tradition and its principles.    
 Kropotkin set himself against a strain in Darwinist social and biological 
theory exemplified by T.H.Huxley who saw nature as the struggle of individuals 
with each other, and, hence, as giving us no basis for ethics which accordingly 
has be constructed on some other basis if at all.[Kinna 1995:276; Eddy 2010:24-
6; Kropotkin 1902/1987:16-17; Woodcock 1962: 198-201]   Kropotkin argued 
that Huxley had misread the evidence of zoology and biology, seeing as 
competition what can more plausibly be seen as the cooperation between 
individuals in their efforts to cope with their environment.[Eddy 2010: 26-7; 
Kinna 1995:275-6; Kropotkin 1902/1887:12-14]   According to Kropotkin, 
Huxley wrongly draws a sharp distinction between nature and culture, and 
wrongly focusses on the level of isolated individuals rather than individuals in 
relations with other individuals, other groups and environment. [Eddy 2010:26-
8; Kropotkin 1902/1887:16-17]   One reading of Kropotkin locates this 
argument in social theory and science, as an argument for the naturalness of 
anarchism, and hence its status as a future which will come about.  As such, as a 
theory it is subject to sceptical criticism of Kropotkin's wishful thinking.   
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 By contrast, Kinna argues we should understand the theory of mutual aid 
in the context of political action and rhetoric.  It is a theory to motivate anarchist 
action.  It is oriented against the marxist understanding of the state as much as 
against strains in social Darwinism.  It is a call against marxist political tactics.  
The theory of mutual aid gives us a means of understanding the natural world, 
not as struggle but as liberation and salvation, and as continuous with the social 
world we seek to change.[Kinna 1995:270-2] 
 Errico Malatesta's 1895 article 'Violence as a social factor' was a response 
to a pacifist article published in the same periodical that criticised anarchists for 
their recourse to violence and terrorism.[Graham ed 2005:160]   Malatesta's 
strategy in the article is to endorse the pacific, non-violent nature of anarchism, 
and to argue that anarchist uses of bombs and killing are contrary to anarchist 
principles.  But he does not proceed to the pacifist inferences and implications 
that we find in the thought of Tolstoy or of the other pacifist thinkers such as 
T.H.Bell, to whom he was responding.   Malatesta sets out to expose the 
corrupting, damaging, nature of violence which  
'suffocates the best sentiments of man, and [develops] all the anti-social 
qualities: ferocity, hatred, revenge, the spirit of domination and tyrannny, 
contempt of the weak, servility towards the strong. And this harmful 
tendency arises also when violence is used for a good end.' [Malatesta 
1895/2005:160]  
Malatesta laments that the  
'excitement caused by some recent explosions and the admiration for the 
courage with which the bomb-throwers faced death, sufficed to cause 
many Anarchists to forget their programme, and to enter on a path which 
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is the most absolute negation of all anarchist ideas and sentiments.  
Hatred and revenge seemed to have become the moral basis of 
Anarchism.  "The bourgeoisie does as bad and worse".   Such is the 
argument with which they tried to justify and exalt every brutal 
deed.'[Malatesta 1985/2005:161]  
According to Malatesta's analysis  the principles of the inviolability of human life, 
love, and toleration must be at the centre of anarchism, which must be constantly 
aware of the dangers of violence, hatred, and the spirit of revenge. [Malatesta 
1895/2005:163] 
 Tolstoy, in his essay on anarchism agreed with anarchists that the 
violence of authority under current governmental conditions could not be 
exceeded under anarchism. [Tolstoy 1900/1990: 68] But he distanced himself 
from anarchists as well as from other activists who used violent means: 
The Anarchists are right in everything: in the negation of the existing 
order, and in the assertion that, without Authority, there could not be 
worse violence than that of Authority under existing conditions.  They are 
mistaken only in thinking that Anarchy can be instituted by a violent 
revolution. [Tolstoy 1900/1990:68] 
Tolstoy also associates violence above all with the state - and also with church 
and nation.  Politics is more or less coextensive with violence - because the basis 
of political rule and government is the idea that:  
'it is possible, through violence, to unite people in such a way that 
everyone submits, without resistance, to the same structure of life and 
guidance for conduct that results from it'.[Tolstoy 1908/1987:162]  
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 In many places in his essays Tolstoy rejects violence absolutely.   His later 
numerous essays and pamphlets consistently make an argument about the 
nature of the system and structure of violence. [Stephens ed 1990;  Kentish (ed) 
1987; Tolstoy 1900/1948; Tolstoy 1894]  Violence can be passionate - an 
outburst of revenge or anger, and is expressive.  But otherwise, it is used 'only in 
order to compel', and compulsion - doing what other people wish against your 
own will - is slavery. So violence is coextensive with slavery.  It may be thought 
that violence can only be abolished with violence. But this is like fighting fire 
with fire. The only answer is to abolish 'whatever renders governmental violence 
possible'.  Government is unnecessary, it is highly immoral and harmful, and the 
only course is to refuse to participate in government at all.  One should not 
willingly be a soldier or a tax payer, nor hold any office, nor participate in 
governmental institutions like schools. One should not appeal to government for 
protection. [Tolstoy 1900/1948:122-7] 
 Violence cannot work as a back up to law,  as some political theories hope 
or predict.   Violence can be used against those who do not comply, or in order to 
force compliance, just as it can be used to drag a person or an animal where they 
do not want to go.  [Tolstoy1900/1948:120] But this only means that law is 
violent in its inception and is inextricable from violence. [Tolstoy 
1900/1948:112]  This theme of the coercion of others, the use of force, covers a 
wide range of institutions and phenomena.  Certainly, Tolstoy's initial despair is 
at the uses of extreme violence against the body - weapons and bombs and 
physical fighting, in war, in revolutionary politics, [Tolstoy1908/1987:153] in 
state punishment and military punishment,[Tolstoy 1908/1987:162, 191] and in 
economic servitude. [Tolstoy 1908/1987:158-9]  But his emphasis on political 
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organisation, the state and church as such means that the institutions of violence 
that must be rejected encompass far more:  
'If you, emperors, presidents, generals, judges, bishops, professors and 
other learned men need armies, navies, universities, ballots, synods, 
conservatoires, prisons, gallows and guillotines, do it all yourselves: 
collect your own taxes, judge, execute and imprison among yourselves, 
murder people in war, but do it all yourselves and leave us in peace 
because we need none of it, and we no longer wish to participate in all 
these useless and above all evil deeds!'[Tolstoy 1908/1987:179]  
That is, violence is systematically connected to organisation: Those who 'are 
preoccupied with organising the lives of others' are 'pitiable, deeply misled 
people' who 'manifest nothing worthy'. [Tolstoy 1908/1987:128]  He warns the 
young against any participation in government, any illusion that people's welfare 
can be increased by state administration.[Tolstoy 1908/1987: 219]  Any 
preoccupation with organising the lives of others is a 'vile, criminal affair, 
destructive to the soul.'[Tolstoy 1908/1987:219] 
 For Tolstoy the ultimate justification of non-violence and non-
participation in government is the gospel: 'And fear not them which kill the body 
but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both 
soul and body in hell.'[Matthew x.28]  This is the first epigraph in 'The Law of 
Love and the Law of Violence'.[Tolstoy:1908/1987:151]   The anti-state, anti-
politics argument is an inference from the Sermon on the Mount on one hand, 
and social theory on the other, and in its uncompromising rejection of 
organisation and state, of heteronomy of any kind, is unambiguously anarchist in 
the sense of 'no authority external to the agent'.  As Romain Rolland insisted, this 
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extends to anything we might be tempted to think of as 'the authority of Christ': 
Tolstoy is by no means obedient to Christ or the scriptures. Rather we should act 
as the scriptures would have us act because the scriptures are true: our 
motivation to comply with the scripture is authority independent. [Rolland 
1920:41] 
  Any thought that we 'need to oppose evil with violence' is based on 
another evil - the 'primitive superstition that it is possible for man not only to 
know, but to organise, the future the way he likes.'  That is, the impulse to control 
is itself evil.  Both bodily violence such as running the gauntlet on the one hand, 
and on the other order in general, are evil because they presume too 
much.[Tolstoy 1908/1987:214] In the face of evil one must act as always: 'A 
man's conscience may demand that he sacrifice his own life, but not that of 
another person.'[Tolstoy 1908/1987:215]   Leave aside the consideration that 
replying to violence with violence is futile; or the fact that theories of 
punishment ignore the social conditions that lead to crime.[ Tolstoy 
1908/1987:216, 215]   The real point is that  
'acceptance of the need to oppose evil with violence is nothing other than 
the justification people give to their habitual and favourite vices: 
vengeance, avarice, envy, ambition, pride, cowardice and spite.'[Tolstoy 
1908/1987:216]  
Tolstoy has an instrumental argument about the circle of violence, which can 
only be closed, never broken, by more violence. [Tolstoy 1900/1990:69-70] 
To use violence is impossible; it would only cause reaction. To join the 
ranks of the Government is also impossible - one would only become its 
instrument.  One course therefore remains - to fight the Government by 
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means of thought, speech, actions, life, neither yielding to Government, 
nor joining its ranks and thereby increasing its power. [Tolstoy 
1900/1990:70] 
 We saw earlier Malatesta's statement of anarchist commitment to peace 
and non-violence, and his disapproval of anarchist activists who seemed to be 
revelling in violence.[Malatesta 1895/2005:160-2] His article, though, takes the 
form of a defence of pacifist principles followed by a significant and far-reaching 
caveat.  He echoes Brousse in his insistence on the rightness of self-defence and 
the defence of others against violence.  One  
'should not kill a man to avoid being punched; but would not hesitate to 
break his legs if he could not do otherwise to prevent his killing him.  And 
when it is a question of like evils, such as killing so as not to be killed, 
even then it seems to me that it is an advantage to society that the 
aggressor should die rather than the aggressed.  But if self-defence is a 
right one may renounce, the defence of others at the risk of hurting the 
aggressor is the duty of solidarity.'[Malatesta 1895/2005:162]  
Malatesta argues that there is no way that emancipation can be attained without 
any use of violence. The state, the ruling class, 'is ever arming itself with more 
powerful means of repression, and systematically uses violence  ...' [Malatesta 
1895/2005: 162] In this situation anarchists must call attention to the dangers of 
the use of violence, but  
'if we really wish to strive for the emancipation of the people, do not let us 
reject in principle the means without which the struggle can never be 
ended.' [Malatesta 1895/2005: 163] 
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Violence may be used 'only as a weapon in the struggle of right against wrong'.  
Anarchy will be that social system in which each social group is able, within the 
limits imposed by the liberty of others, to experiment on the mode of life which it 
believes to be the best.  Anarchism is committed to the efficacy of persuasion and 
example.   
 That is, Malatesta denies Tolstoy's equation of violence with slavery, and 
distinguishes the violence of those who must act in self-defence, or of those who 
use violence with the aim of achieving freedom and voluntarism, from the 
violence of those who seek to oppress, to deprive, to prevent freedom, to coerce.  
For him, the violence that seeks freedom, and is for justice, is a justified violence, 
but to be thought of as a necessary evil.   
 
Violence in politics: meanings and justifications   
 Bakunin, in the works analysed here, frames violence in a number of 
contrasting ways.  First, it is the 'primitive ferocity' of peasants and proletariat, 
the people who resist social superiors and state authorities, whose compliance 
with either can only be got by coercion and compulsion, and who are capable of 
building the cooperative society within which freedom can flower.[Bakunin 
1870/1971:200] In this frame violence is connected both with resistance to 
unjust authority, and with the energy that underpins people's capacities for 
choice and decisiveness.  The people have the capacity, potentially at least, to 
break imposed order, to break their tutelage by social and state powers.[Bakunin 
1870/1971: 205] Second, there is the violence that is visited upon the potentially 
revolutionary classes by the reactionaries, by the oppressors and exploiters, by 
the state institutions that defend the existing order of ownership and control.  If 
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the peasantry and proletariat have the capacity and the potentiality to 
permanently smash the governmental machinery, to engage in a 'spontaneous, 
uncompromising, passionate, anarchic and destructive uprising' which is the 
only thing that can save France [Bakunin 1870/1971:188] then the bourgeoisie 
who enslave them, under the guise of civilisation, also have the will to go to war 
to shore up their hold on resources.[Bakunin 1870/1971: 185-6] So, as we have 
seen, for Bakunin violence will take the form of civil war which is the outcome of 
the meeting of oppression, either overt or in the guise of civilisation, with  
ferocious, resistant energy.   
 Kropotkin, on our reading, understands violence in a broadly similar set 
of frames.   He emphasises the violence of the state, which is resistant to social 
change.  This violence shows itself, of course, in police and military action, in 
courts and prisons, in state executions and other 'stupidly ferocious' 
punishment. [Kropotkin 1899/1971:425]   It can also disguise itself; but will be 
revealed in response to challenge, and there will then be violence in the form of 
fighting, injury, blood.[Cahm 1989:93]  Both Kropotkin and Bakunin, by their 
emphasis on the violence of the state, and the state's role in defending the 
existing oppressive economy and society, frame the violence of the civil war, or 
of the insurrection, revolt or rebellion, as self-defence, a necessary evil within the 
context of the prevailing violence of the state, an unavoidably paradoxical route 
to the undoing of violence and the building of a genuinely non-violent 
world.[Kropotkin 1885/2005:154-6; Miller 1984:119] 
The context of anarchist politics of their time, as we have seen, also 
featured anarchist assassins and bombers though.  So the public discourse of 
anarchist violence encompassed further frames.  In courtroom defences and 
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other discourses, anarchist activists and sympathisers articulated an account of 
violence as revenge; or as retaliation or retribution - which goes beyond the 
category of self-defence.[Miller 1984:116-7] So Emile Henry, who bombed the 
Cafe Terminus at Saint-Lazare station in 1894 argued in his trial defence that his 
act was part of the anarchist war against the bourgeoisie, it was retaliation 
against the violence of factory owners against workers, of police against 
children.[Henry 1894]   The extent to which anarchist activists took up this 
theme, and framed the violence of the anarchist war as revenge, can also be seen 
in part of the response to Vera Zasulich's attempted assassination of General 
Trepov in 1878.  Trepov was implicated in a barbarous attack on a political 
prisoner, and was associated in liberal and radical minds with the worst excesses 
of the brutal Tsarist regime.  Zasulich was acquitted in a trial that became a 
prosecution of Trepov and Tsarism themselves.[Cahm 1989:86,91,109] 
Neither Bakunin nor Kropotkin articulate any idea of revolutionary 
violence as revenge.  Their logic of self-defence, as well as their logic of 
unmasking the reality of state violence, denied the validity of any justification in 
terms of revenge or retaliation.  Nevertheless, in his engagement with and 
comments on incidents of anarchist violence - including Zasulich's shooting of 
Trepov, a successful assassination of the head of the secret police in August of 
1878,  and then the successful assassination of Tsar Alexander in 1881 -  
Kropotkin's characterisations and understandings of violence were 
complicated.[Cahm 1989:140-2]   
We have met the idea of the propagandism of exemplary deeds.  In this 
frame, assassination would reveal the regime to be vulnerable, with this 
perception reverberating among the poor, creating revolutionary consciousness, 
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and demoralising the ruling class.[Miller 1984:118]  Zasulich's attempt on 
Trepov was popular, put him in the frame of accountability, and elicited wide 
sympathy for her.  However,  subsequent attempted and actual assassinations, 
including that of Alexander II, were by no means efficacious in generating 
widespread sympathy for the anarchists, and were liable to have the opposite 
effect of causing widespread sympathy for the victims and revulsion against the 
bombers.[Miller 1984:118]   Both Bakunin and Kropotkin were critical of this 
instrumental reasoning, and of claims made for violence's efficacy.[Miller 
1984:119; Miller 1976:174-5;  Leier 2006:249]   
 Kropotkin was further troubled by the individualism of much anarchist 
analysis of assassination, and his criticism of individualism was connected with 
his profound scepticism about efficacy arguments.   For him assassination and 
any other acts of violence could by no means be a substitute for popular and 
collective revolutionary organisation and organisation, and he feared that as 
exemplary deeds which would generate widespread revolt they would be 
useless.[Cahm 1989:135-6] He predicted that a chain of such individual acts 
would make of any revolution that did occur nothing more than a useless 
massacre.[Cahm 1989:140].  Nevertheless, as Cahm shows, he was intrigued by 
the possibility of a 'serious conspiracy between individuals' as opposed to the 
idea of a mass insurrection.[Cahm 1989:145-151].   
Kropotkin did, however, concede necessity arguments: because of the 
context of state and reactionary social violence, the oppressed, the opponents, 
the revolutionists, are in situations where violence is inevitable.[Miller 
1984:119-120]   Kropotkin, at his own trial in Lyon in 1888, speaking with 
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respect to Zasulich's attack on Trepov, commented, consistently with the logic of 
self-defence and the logic of necessity:  
I think that when a party, like the nihilists of Russia, finds itself in a 
position where it must either disappear, subside, or answer violence with 
violence - then it  has no cause to hesitate, and must necessarily use 
violence. [Cahm 1989:109]   
Kropotkin’s response stresses the extent to which revolutionaries are already in 
a fight for survival; on these grounds their uses of violence may be 
understandable, but they are not justifiable in terms of delivering any particular 
outcome, or as exemplary actions.  
 In contrast to the assassins' revenge arguments, Kropotkin saw the 
necessity and inevitability of violence, and the consequent deaths, executions, 
and ferocious punishments of revolutionaries as exemplary sacrifice. He was 
outraged at the bourgeouis representation of Alexander II as a martyred 
liberator of the serfs, and the narodniks as evil murderers, and instead extolled 
the  
'men and women who have sacrificed the joys of liberty, friends, and life 
to the cause.'[Cahm 1989:142] 
This idea of sacrifice also fits into an account of tragic inevitability.  Alexander 
was a 
born autocrat, whose violence was but partially mitigated by education of 
a man, a military hero devoid of courage, a man of strong passion and 
weak will - it seemed that the tragedy developed with the unavoidable 
fatality of one of Shakespeare's dramas.[Kropotkin 1899/1971: 433] 
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 Zasulich herself found her actions framed out of kilter with her own 
understanding.  According to Cahm she had no particular expectations about the 
impact of her attempt on Trepov - she did not approach it instrumentally.  
Neither did she - or her defence lawyer - articulate any account of revenge as 
such.  Rather she thought of her action as a protest against the brutality of 
Trepov, the brutality of the prison regime that allowed or enjoined that 
prisoners be flogged, and against the brutality of the tsarist state.  As protest, an 
action can be taken simply as presence, appearance, insistence that an opposing 
view is present in the public space.  Associated anarchists, though, interpreted 
Zasulich's action through the frame of their own understandings of 
assassination. When she arrived in Switzerland after her release, she found that 
local anarchists tried to appropriate her into their suite of propaganda by deed, 
and also tried to use her to promote anarchism against their rivals the social 
democrats.[Cahm 1989:108-9] 
 Tolstoy was notable in the range of liberal and radical opinion in 1878 in 
that he did not celebrate Zasulich's acquittal, admire her deed, or see her as 
standing for a progressive or even a significant oppositional position against 
tsarist authoritarianism and brutality.  Tolstoy equated her actions and Trepov's, 
arguing that both she and the brutal governmental officer she had attempted to 
kill were 'trash and animals'.[Medszhibovskaya 2008:510-511]   Tolstoy 
certainly had no time for any principles of revenge or retaliation: he identified 
lex talonis as one of the supports of the modern state, and one that contributed 
significantly to the state's inherent violence.[Medzhibovskaya 2008:510;  Tolstoy 
1894 VolI:45]   And he was equally dismissive of claims as to the necessity, 
efficacy or exemplary power of violence. 
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 We can follow Medzhibovskaya's reading of Tolstoy's changing 
constructions of violence.  Medzhibovskaya formulates her topic, actually, as 
'terror' rather than 'violence' but in our interpretation her account of Tolstoy's 
earlier (pre-1878 in her analysis) understanding of terror (the use of bombs and 
assassination) shows that Tolstoy was concerned about all forms of violence.  
For him the form of the state, and the state's functions in organisation, legislation 
and the enforcement of law, and the defence of the established order of property, 
control and authority, condense all forms of violence, setting up chains of 
violence, closed circles which can never be opened by more violence.[Tolstoy 
1900/1990: 70] 
 Medzhibovskaya reports an unfinished note from about 1861 which 
Tolstoy entitled 'On Violence', which distinguishes between zoological and 
political violence, the former being a primordial force that might be expressed 
naturally in anger, and the latter the simulation, organization and amplification 
of that force by the state. Tolstoy also noted the acquiescence in violence, out of a 
prudential desire for self-preservation, by the majority of individuals. 
[Medzhibovskaya pp.509] The text implies that this - the state violence, 
acquiesced in by compliant subjects - is 'the real terror'.   In War and Peace, 
Tolstoy questions the condensation of wills, consent, and capacity in the 
sovereign - who accordingly transcends the state, an awesome figure 
commanding love and obedience, with his generals and others organising, 
administering, and fighting for the defence, and the glory, of the state:  
Rostov got up and went wandering among the camp fires dreaming of 
what happiness it would be to die - not in saving the Emperor's life (he 
did not even dare to dream of that) but simply to die before his eyes.  He 
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really was in love with the Tsar and the glory of the Russian arms and the 
hope of future triumph.  And he was not the only man to experience that 
feeling during those memorable days preceding the battle of Austerlitz; 
nine-tenths of the men in the Russian army were then in love.... [War and 
Peace Bk 1 Pt 3 ch 10]  
 The questioning doesn't just proceed from the irony in this depiction of 
the excess of adoration.  It also proceeds from Tolstoy's depiction of the way the 
actors - whether the Tsar himself, the celebrated generals such as Kutuzov, the 
officers, the soldiers, or the people of the villages and towns around which the 
war is conducted - are 'carried along by unknown force'.[Medzhibovskaya 
2008:509] In fact, there are lots of known forces in the scenes leading up to and 
of the battle of Austerlitz: crowds of soldiers running the wrong way[War and 
Peace Bk 1 Pt 3 Ch16], but also the stream that bears the soldier on - he is borne 
along by his regiment, he marches whatever he will [Bk1 Pt3 Ch14], and the 
aspect of military organisation that is like clockwork: an impulse once given 
leads to the final result.[Bk1 Pt3 Ch11]   In particular, peasant soldiers die 
trudgingly where they are driven.[Gallie 1978:122]   There are also deficits of 
force - the failures of generals to properly plan, or organise, or coordinate, or 
resource, or lead; deficits of information, uncertainty; individuals' loss of will or 
strength.[Bk1 Pt3 Chs .... ] And overall is the fog: the lack of visibility, of sight not 
only foresight:  
The fog had grown so dense that though it was growing light they could 
not see ten paces ahead...... Below where the fight was beginning there 
was still thick fog; on the higher ground it was clearing, but nothing could 
be seen of what was going on in front. [War and Peace  Bk1 Pt3 Ch14] 
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The fog of war - the confusion, the pain - from the point of view of the individual 
might be transcended by the authority of military strategy and command, under 
the guiding light of the sovereign power and law. Or, it might not - it might be 
that, as Gallie puts it, 'war at all levels is nothing but mess.'[Gallie 1978:104] 
 Four points emerge as of particular importance in terms of how Tolstoy 
conceptualizes and evaluates violence, and the prescriptive implications of his 
account.  First, the distinction between zoological and political violence 
introduced above is carried through all of his work, including his novels.  There 
are many scenes of violence in War and Peace: Pierre Bezukhov's duel,[Bk2 Pt1 
Ch5], the public flogging of French servants in Moscow [Bk3 Pt2 Ch18], even 
aspects of Pierre's experience of freemasonry.[Bk2 Pt2 Ch4]   All of these are 
connected to the social and political system of inequality, authority and 
sovereignty; they all take their meaning from, as Tolstoy would put it later, the 
state.  And they all contrast with natural expressions of violence in immediate 
response to injury. 
 Second, Tolstoy is adamant that individuals must refuse to engage in the 
state institutions of violence: in anything that criminalises non-compliers such as 
the civil service, in any direct uses of force such as the military, the police, the 
prisons; the organised churches which use the offices of the state to support 
their control over people's lives.  He does not prescribe for everyone that they 
refuse to pay taxes, but he does prescribe for everyone that they should refuse to 
collect them.[Tolstoy 1900/1948:129] Only we can take responsibility for 
violence, and the only way to end it is to refuse to engage in it or with it. [Hopton 
2000:29-33] 
 30 
 Third, the violence of the state has endless, perverse and paradoxical 
ramifications.  The state is condensed violence; the chaos that surrounds the 
state's efforts to order, direct, and control sends out waves of violence which 
individuals visit on each other.[Tolstoy 1900/1948:nn] There is sovereign 
warfare with all its splendour and hierarchy - and there is guerilla violence, 
partisan actions by coalescences of stragglers, marauders, and foragers, who 
have to be seen off by country people banding together 'as instinctively as dogs 
worry a stray mad dog to death'[War and Peace Bk4 Pt3 Ch3], or 'a duellist who 
drops his rapier and seizes a cudgel' [Pt 3 Bk1 Ch1] Dolokhov, who duelled with 
Pierre years earlier, and his second Denisov, become leaders in the irregular 
warfare, breaking the rules of military science and, of course, inflicting terrible 
violence, and involving children [Pt 3 Bk1 Ch3 ff]   In Tolstoy's later essays on 
violence, peace and state, there is a parallel model of the condensed state 
violence of prisons and sovereignty which send out waves of violence such as the 
beatings of peasants by aristocrats; a brutal sovereignty makes for a brutal 
society. Violence, in all of its manifestations, breeds violence. 
 Fourth, Tolstoy is strikingly vague about the anarchist society - which will 
be horizontal rather than hierarchical, without the levels of organisation we see 
in institutions like the army, the commune, the bureaucracy or, presumably, the 
organised social systems like the Moscow and St Petersburg rounds of balls, 
dinners, receptions and organised courtship and marriage - and the 
corresponding poverty of the city.[Bartlett 2013:96-7,291-2]   He certainly does 
not engage in any considerations of economy, production and exchange, such as 
we find in Bakunin and Kropotkin. His account of an alternative to the logic of 
violence stops at the level of individual refusal to participate in the organized 
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and organizing violence of the state, a refusal incumbent on everyone, including 
those in positions of power. 
 After the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 Tolstoy wrote to Alexander 
III to advise him to break the cycle of violence. [Medzhibovskaya 2008: pp] In 
this letter he describes the terrorists as fanatics, acknowledges the Tsar's wish 
for revenge, and calls on him as sovereign to purge the wrath of the state and 
society, and to exercise the christian law of pardon.  He pleaded with the Tsar to 
set a christian example - to return good for evil.  The cycle of violence from state 
to society could be broken, in Tolstoy's view, by the widespread mass pacific 
action that he enjoins on all, that is radical individualism.  Or it could be broken, 
paradoxically, by an exemplary act of forgiveness by the sovereign, by 
sovereignty.  
 
Undoing Violence 
 We have seen that the question of violence for anarchism is a complex 
series  - in addition to the challenge of pacifism itself, exemplified by Tolstoy's 
absolutism (and in later anarchist and pacifist thinking developed as the theory 
and practice of non-violence) there is the question of how violence should be 
framed, and its place in anarchist practice and action.  Bakunin and Tolstoy start 
with a two-fold distinction: Bakunin's 'primitive', Tolstoy's 'passionate' or 
'zoological' natural violences versus the violences of oppression and exploitation, 
of state authority and its concomitant social relations.  Kropotkin is less 
susceptible to the idea of 'natural' violence, his biological work being devoted to 
defeat of this pervasive idea; but on the subject of state violence, and the 
effective civil war that inheres between those who aspire to anarchic or socialist 
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community and those who defend hierarchy and exploitation he is at one with 
the others.   
 Bakunin and Kropotkin frame violence as inevitable.  Anarchist activists 
will face up to the reality of violence in modern states and societies; they will 
brace themselves and face with courage the war that revolutionary aspiration 
and action will inevitably unleash.  They put violence, that is, in a frame of 
courage and realism.  Violent actions by revolutionaries can meet the test of 
these virtues.  However, this 'politics of courage' as we might call it, has also to 
be twinned with a 'politics of revelation'.  An important aspect of anarchist action 
will be its function of unmasking, of revealing the state violence that underlies 
apparent social peace.  Bakunin and Kropotkin, as well as other anarchists of 
their time, think also in the frame of strategic provocation.  It is only the war, 
after all, that can incept the revolution.  If people are not to be bought off by so-
called rights and apparent civil order, the reality of state violence must be made 
evident.   
 This kind of strategic political action is still to be clearly distinguished 
from misguided use of bombs and weapons, and justifications in terms of 
retaliation and revenge.  Revolutionary sacrifice is one thing, and to be 
understood and praised.  Revenge, on the other hand, is corrupting, connected 
with ferocity, brutality and hatred.   
 For Tolstoy violence coerces an individual against his will, and equates 
with slavery.  Politics seeks to coerce by way of obedience to state authority; and 
state authority is based in violence.  For Tolstoy, as we have seen, there can be no 
politics that is ethical; he has recourse to an ethics of renunciation.  Where 
Bakunin and Kropotkin consider how the oppressed and exploited can hope for - 
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and organise for - liberation from the radically asymmetrical struggle in which 
they are enmeshed, Tolstoy equates organisation with the coercion of violence 
and politics.  Bakunin and Kropotkin have recourse to the idea of war, in order to 
ground the logic of self-defence, the logic of strategy, and the logic of liberation, 
that justify and condition anarchist revolutionary violence.  But Tolstoy vividly 
demonstrates the weaknesses of any reliance on an idea of war to overcome the 
violence of the state.   
 Tolstoy's rejection of war, and of self-defence, though is shot through with 
ambiguity and paradox.  Romain Rolland, comparing Tolstoy with Gandhi, 
remarked that 'everything in Tolstoy is violence, even his doctrine of non-
violence'.[Rolland 1924:97; McKeogh 2009:195; Lavrin 1960:134].  McKeogh 
argues that the theme of renunciation, and the lack of concern for society and 
social relationships - both the dread and the fascination with annihilation of the 
self, the resistance to organisation of any sort - effectively promotes the 
extinction of human life.  This adds up to a form of violence.  Tolstoy's violent 
renunciation of violence is also a renunciation of politics as a co-operative 
endeavour.[McKeogh 2009:208]  Tolstoyan non-violence is the opposite of 
Kropotkin's mutual aid.  It is an individual refusal that gains exemplary meaning 
when the individual has something to refuse - the possessions and 
responsibilities of a landowner, for example.  It has effects only when 
underpinned by violence, whether this is the Tsar's capacity to hold back his 
troops and police, or Tolstoy's own capacity to command members of his 
household and family.   
 In War and Peace as we have seen Tolstoy questions the alleged 
condensation of all wills in the sovereign will of the Tsar, showing the confusion 
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of collective action when people are in contexts of violence, and the deadly 
outcomes of the kind of compliance that leads soldiers to plod on into the line of 
fire.  He cannot see any possibility of productive collective action in the 
historical, social and sovereign contexts he surveys, the fields of battle or the 
ballrooms.  So Tolstoy has recourse only to the vain possibility of the Tsar 
exercising sovereign clemency in an exemplary act that will break the chain of 
violence where nothing else can, or to the individual's sovereign renunciation of 
others and of social norms.   
 Kropotkin's thinking about violence addresses the same paradox of 
individual and collective agency. He does not let go of the possibility of mutual 
action in concert, and as we have seen is clear that individual acts such as 
throwing bombs are futile.  Mutuality and cooperation are the anarchist aim, and 
also the anarchist means.  However, individual actions of course are important in 
anarchist theory.  Like Bakunin, Kropotkin both defends and sceptically 
disavows individuals who commit violent deeds.  David Miller takes Kropotkin's 
refusal to condemn nihilist violence as a disavowal of the individual's 
responsibility for her actions.[Miller 1984:119-120]  But Kropotkin's response 
can be interpreted differently.  He acknowledges that these acts, framed as they 
will be in the context of society and state, are likely to be counter-productive to 
the anarchist cause.  Yet, he also wants to acknowledge them as political acts, 
which aim at the furtherance of anarchism. To individualise these actors is to 
deny anarchist politics.   
 For Kropotkin, and for other anarchist thinkers, violence is being inflicted, 
and the choice, the question, is about how, not whether, to fight it.  This is a 
political judgement and decision.  The language of individual responsibility, by 
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contrast, is relatively depoliticised.   It is  absolutely depoliticised in Tolstoy's 
idea of the sovereign, renouncing, individual in relation to the overwhelming 
confusion and the uncontrollable causal forces of history and society.  This tense 
relationship between individuals' own personal decisions about what kinds of 
actions they engage in, and the political imperative of action in concert haunts 
anarchism still.[Gelderloos  2015:287]  Individual actions in public settings have 
effects beyond the individual; yet anarchist activists resist the idea of binding 
norms constraining individual actions.[Gelderloos 2015:19]  Tolstoy leaves 
violence in place when he repudiates political action in concert; Bakunin and 
Kropotkin leave violence in place in their plans for its undoing.   
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